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ON BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT
Timothy M. Mulvaney*
In his recent article, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz,
Professor Sean Nolon builds off the pioneering work of Carol Rose, Tony
Arnold, and select other property scholars to highlight the role of
negotiation in land use law.1 In so doing, he offers a fine contribution to
the longstanding debate on regulatory takings law as it pertains to the
often bargained-for conditions, or “exactions,” state entities attach to
land-use permits. In theory, these conditional permits aim to counter
proposed development projects’ external harms in lieu of denying those
proposals outright. Professor Nolon concludes that the Supreme Court’s
recent ill-defined expansion of the circumstances in which such
conditions might give rise to takings liability in Koontz v. St. John’s River
Water Management District2 will chill the state’s willingness to
communicate with permit applicants about mitigation measures.3 He sets
out five courses that government entities might take in this confusing and
chilling post-Koontz world, each of which leaves something to be desired
from the perspective of both developers and the public more generally.4
This responsive essay proceeds in two parts. First, it illuminates the
chilling effect Professor Nolon perceives by explaining Koontz’s
grounding in the retroactive takings compensation principle adopted by
the Supreme Court nearly thirty years ago in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.5 Second, it
suggests that Professor Nolon’s list of potential government responses to
Koontz can be expanded to include at least five additional (if admittedly
more radical) courses, several of which may hold slightly more promise
for the public than those advanced in Professor Nolon’s insightful
critique.

* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I thank Mark Fenster and
Christopher Serkin for reviewing earlier versions of this essay. I am grateful for the fine research
assistance of Matthew McGowan.
1. Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court
Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 192 (2014).
2. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
3. See Nolon, supra note 1, at 219. This reflects, as Mark Fenster describes it, a
“consequential focus [that] is the source of [Nolon’s] article’s strength.” See Mark Fenster,
Regulating in the Post-Koontz World, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 26 (2015).
4. Nolon, supra note 1, at 211–19.
5. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
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I. THE ROOTS OF KOONTZ’S CHILLING EFFECT
Until the 1980s, it was largely understood that the state need not pay
compensation for property later found to be taken by a regulatory action
if the state repealed that regulatory action immediately upon the takings
finding.6 Yet in its 1987 decision in First English, the Supreme Court
concluded that “where the government’s activities have already worked
a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective.”7
There is broad agreement that First English’s holding requiring
compensation in these instances has a chilling effect on government
regulation.8 Determining whether a regulation amounts to a compensable
taking usually is dependent on a fact-sensitive analysis first discussed in
the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, 9 which requires inquiries about the economic impact
of the regulation, the claimant’s investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action at issue. After First English,
legislators and administrators alike are hesitant to adopt new regulatory
programs in light of the possibility that, given the nature of a Penn
Central analysis, they might inadvertently step over the indistinct Penn
Central line and, even despite immediately withdrawing the nowdeemed-unconstitutional measure, possibly be forced to pay a
considerable amount of money for the period during which that measure
was in place.10 And, at least according to the recent state appellate court
decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, Koontz extends this
retroactive temporary takings compensation principle to the realm of
exactions.
Koontz comes in the wake of the Supreme Court’s companion cases

6. The next two paragraphs draw in part from a previously published book chapter. See
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Temporary Takings, More or Less, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 463 (Randall S. Abate, ed.,
Oxford University Press) (2015).
7. Id. at 465.
8. See, e.g., Daniel L. Siegel, The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Takings Law, 23
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 273, 274 (2005); Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings
Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 42 (1987).
9. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). There are two types of regulations outside the exactions
context that are not subject to a deferential level of judicial scrutiny, for the Supreme Court has
asserted that they amount to categorical takings: those regulations that result in a permanent
physical invasion, as set out in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
439 (1982), or a total economic wipeout, in accord with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 830 (1990).
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of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission11 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,12 which together held that the state—as the defendant—shoulders
the burden of proving that some unspecified class of permit conditions
bear an “essential nexus” to and are in “rough proportionality” with the
proposed development’s impacts to avoid having to pay takings
compensation. When compared to Penn Central, these decisions have
been described as imposing a form of heightened scrutiny in the sense
that their tests place the burden of proof on the defendant government
entity, authorize a searching review of the relationship between an
exaction’s structure and the public objectives in imposing that exaction,
and allow for takings liability findings in instances where the economic
impact of the exaction is minimal.13 In this sense, the chilling effect
recognized after First English in the context of ordinary regulations may
be all the more pronounced in the exactions context. An abridged review
of Koontz illustrates the point.
Koontz bought a 15-acre lot consistently predominantly of wetlands
for just under $100,000 in 1972. The state condemned one acre of
Koontz’s parcel in 1987, paying approximately $400,000 in “just
compensation” (including severance damages). Years later, Koontz
sought permission from the state’s regional water district to build a
shopping mall on the remaining 14 acres. After reviewing Koontz’s
permit application, the water district originally proposed conditions that,
in its view, would mitigate the mall’s wetland impacts.14 Koontz scoffed
at the proposed conditions. The water district then withdrew those
conditions and denied the requested permit, after which Koontz promptly
filed a takings suit. The water district ultimately reconsidered its
decision—for reasons that are not altogether clear—and unconditionally
granted the permit after the case had crawled along for several years in
the face of disputed procedural issues. Yet, with permit in hand, Koontz
continued to press his claim for takings compensation.15 In the course of
11. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607–08 (1988);
Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse,
88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1651 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional
Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 868 (1995); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan
Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2184–
87 (2002); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 622; Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough,
Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard on Local Governments’ Land-Use Powers, in
TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS
219 (David L. Callies ed., 1996); Donald C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Direction of
Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L. REV. 327, 346 (1998).
14. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–93 (2013).
15. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1224–25 (Fla. 2011).
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this lengthy litigation, Koontz sold his 14 acres to a development
company for $1.2 million.
Roughly converting these figures to today’s dollars, Koontz
purchased the parcel for approximately $550,000 and sold it for
approximately $2.25 million without ever having made any
improvements. Recognizing as much, he appropriately conceded that he
had no viable Penn Central claim. However, in 2009, a state appellate
panel determined that Koontz was entitled to $477,000 in takings
compensation for the property’s lost rental value over the period of time
between the denial of his original development application and the
issuance of the permit in light of the fact that the initially proposed
conditions did not comport with Nollan and Dolan’s standards.16
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that, where a
governmental entity (i) proposes permit conditions but (ii) later
withdraws those proposed conditions and (iii) makes a decision to
approve or deny the requested permit, those temporarily proposed
conditions are subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.17
The decision describes Koontz as presenting a dispute that fits within
Nollan and Dolan’s “special application” of the Court’s unconstitutional
conditions jurisprudence.18 This description is peculiar for, among other
reasons, the Court stated that nothing was ever actually taken from
Koontz.19 Further complicating matters, the Court did not discuss what
remedy, if any, might be available to a claimant who successfully argues
that a proposed condition does not pass Nollan and Dolan muster, stating
that “[b]ecause [Koontz] brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause
of action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be
available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation either
here or in other cases.”20
16. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009),
decision quashed, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (U.S. 2013).
17. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
18. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
19. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (2013) (concluding that “nothing has been taken”). See
also John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 NYU ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2014) (“Justice Alito has implicitly adopted the novel, indeed bizarre position that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply even in the absence of government action that
violates the Constitution.”).
20. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597. The body of scholarship assessing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Koontz is rapidly expanding. For relatively favorable treatment, see, e.g., Shelley Ross
Saxer, To Bargain or Not to Bargain? A Response to Bargaining For Development Post-Koontz,
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 5 (2015); Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of
Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 215, 216 (2013); Richard Epstein, “Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District:
Of
Issues
Resolved—and
Shoved
under
the
Table,”
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-water-managementdistrict-of-issues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php. For more critical treatment, see, e.g.,
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Yet on remand, the state appellate court recently concluded that its
earlier decision was “entirely consistent” with the Supreme Court’s
decision.21 Therefore, it “reaffirm[ed]” its compensation award for lost
rents over the period of time between the denial of Koontz’s original
development application and the issuance of the permit.22 One could thus
interpret this appellate decision as working to expand First English’s
retroactive takings compensation principle to at least some government
communications made during pre-decisional negotiation sessions and
subjecting such communications to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and
Dolan.
Though the point received scant attention in this recent appellate
decision, it is not altogether evident which communications actually are
subject to Nollan and Dolan. The Supreme Court had stated that it was
declining to reach the state’s claim that the proposed conditions at issue
in the case might be “too indefinite” or not “concrete and specific”
enough to be considered a “demand” that “give[s] rise to liability under
Nollan and Dolan.”23 Moreover, while the Court declared Nollan and
Dolan applicable to some subset of monetary conditions, it did little to
explain the distinction, if any, between monetary exactions, fees, and
taxes.24 Further, the Court did not broach the longstanding debate over
whether Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny, which is applicable to
those exactions imposed administratively on a case-by-case basis, also
should be applicable to those exactions resulting from broadly applicable
legislation.25
With such uncertainties, the unsettling lesson permitting entities can
deduce from the recent state court decision on remand in Koontz is
twofold. First, where the state could deny a permit application under
existing law but considers issuing the permit with conditions (be they
monetary or otherwise) to counter the detrimental impacts of the project,
those conditions may be subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and
Dolan. Second, where the landowner/permittee successfully challenges
any proposed condition as violative of Nollan and Dolan, the state will
Echeverria, supra note 19; John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573 (2015);
Christopher Serkin, The Winners and Losers in Negotiating Exactions: A Response to Sean Nolon,
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 9, 10 (2015); Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name:
Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 404 (2014);
Mulvaney, supra note 6, at 467.
21. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 2014 WL 1703942, at *1 (Fla. 5th DCA
2014).
22. Id.
23. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
24. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q.
131 (2014); Saxer, supra note 20.
25. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property,
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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be required to pay the landowner/permittee compensation for the period
of time during which that proposed condition was on the table, even if it
withdrew that condition on or before the date of the judgment.
II. THE STATE’S PLIGHT AFTER KOONTZ
Professor Nolon sets out five rather unappealing courses that
government entities could take in this confusing and chilling post-Koontz
world: (1) negotiate without making offers;26 (2) insulate negotiation
“through pre-approval processes and waiver;”27 (3) negotiate despite the
risks;28 (4) hire a mediator who can facilitate negotiation among nongovernment stakeholders;29 or (5) deny permit applications outright.30
Building on Professor Nolon’s lucid analysis, the first section below
outlines the drawbacks of these courses. The second section suggests that
there are at least five additional courses—all of which admittedly come
with their own shortcomings and risks—that might be important to
consider in future discussions on governmental action in the face of
Koontz.
A. Professor Nolon’s Proposed Post-Koontz Options
for Land Use Boards
The first two courses set out by Professor Nolon require clearness on
the circumstances under which, in the Supreme Court’s words, a
“demand” should be deemed sufficiently “concrete and specific,” and not
“too indefinite.” In this regard, Professor Nolon asserts that “[a] demand
is ‘definite’ when the board has made a commitment that if the landowner
incorporates the condition into the application, the board will approve the
application,” and “‘specific’ when the board describes the condition with
sufficient detail to provide clarity from an engineering perspective.”31
These important preliminary suggestions about the reach of Koontz open
up new conversations about the meaning of “commitment,” “sufficient
detail,” and “clarity” in this context. These are the very types of
conversations that no doubt will continue in the courts and among
academic commentators for some time. At this point, though, it is not
apparent that the first two courses Professor Nolon proffers present any
shelter from the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan and the
associated retroactive compensation remedy. The same could be said of
the third, negotiate-despite-the-risks course, for it amounts to maintaining
the government’s pre-Koontz strategy.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Nolon, supra note 1, at 215.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 208.
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Professor Nolon acknowledges as much about the first three courses,
and aptly notes that the fourth course also is problematic for it, among
other reasons, removes from the discussion the very planning officials
and technical staff who have the expertise (and the public charge) to study
and evaluate threats to the community resulting from proposed
development projects.32
To Professor Nolon, then, this leaves the state to the fifth course of
issuing more outright permit denials without conversing with applicants
about alternatives in an effort to avoid the risk of confronting heightened
exaction takings scrutiny.33 He specifically notes how this course could
harm developers by reducing the amount of issued permits,34 though it
also could harm the public in the sense that it eschews all contextdependent administration of permit applications in favor of rigid
application of formulaic land use restrictions.35
B. Additional Post-Koontz Options for Land Use Boards
It seems there are at least five additional courses not mentioned by
Professor Nolon that the government could take in the chilling postKoontz environment. They include: (6) issuing more unconditioned
permits; (7) strategically proposing alongside other conditions a
constitutionally acceptable condition that is unpalatable to the applicant;
(8) fashioning land use restrictions not as exactions but rather as use
limitations; (9) asserting that conditions deemed illegal under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot be construed as legal acts that
take property for a public use; and (10) renewing an unqualified challenge
32. Id. at 214.
33. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“[O]bservers have wondered whether those decisions have inclined some local
governments to deny permit applications outright, rather than negotiate agreements that could
work to both sides’ advantage. But that danger would rise exponentially if something less than a
clear condition—if each idea or proposal offered in the back-and-forth of reconciling diverse
interests—triggered Nollan-Dolan scrutiny. At that point, no local government official with a
decent lawyer would have a conversation with a developer.”) (internal citations omitted).
34. Even for those permits that the state does continue to issue, Koontz would impact the
permit review process in at least two ways. First, the state likely would conduct additional timeconsuming pre-decisional studies in light of the fact that it would bear the burden of proof on
nexus and proportionality in any future takings case. Second, the state potentially could charge
developers increased fees to cover the administrative costs of preparing such studies.
35. In a forthcoming paper, I contend that a pronounced shift in land use policy toward
broad, unbending legislative measures could come with significant social implications, given that
in many contexts only administrative processes afford crucially important attention to the affected
parties’ human stories. See Mulvaney, supra note 25. Shelley Saxer approaches the problem from
a different angle in asserting that “if land-use boards opt to deny projects instead of negotiate with
developers to offset externalities by imposing conditions, such a behavioral change will
detrimentally impact a community’s ability to gain the benefits of development, including
improved services and revenue.” Saxer, supra note 20, at 6.

2015]

ON BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT

73

to Nollan and Dolan. While each of these additional courses could benefit
from a far deeper assessment than space allows for here, they can be
preliminarily summarized as follows.
a. Issuing More Unconditioned Permits
The easiest way for state entities to avoid the prospect of retroactive
takings liability under the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is to
issue unconditioned permits. In this instance, the public will bear all of
the external burdens of new development projects. While this course
admittedly could produce some immediate benefits for developers, they,
too, ultimately may suffer from an approach that effectively informs all
landowners that they need not consider the effects of their land uses on
others.
b. Strategic Proposal of Constitutional but Unpalatable Conditions
Koontz notes that, where the state proposes multiple permit
conditions, only one of those conditions need satisfy the strictures of
Nollan and Dolan. The Court stated “[w]e agree with respondent that, so
long as a permitting authority offers the landowner at least one alternative
that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has not been
subjected to an unconstitutional condition.”36 In certain cases, the state
might use this holding to its advantage by assuring that it routinely
proposes one outlandish condition that no rational developer would
accept over the other proposed conditions but that nonetheless does not
offend Nollan and Dolan’s requirements.
The Nollan facts allow for a well-known illustration of this technique.
The Nollan Court concluded that the exaction attached to the permit—a
public walking easement along the ocean—would not alleviate the
government’s stated concern that the development would block the
public’s view of the ocean.37 However, the Court asserted that the state’s
conditioning Nollan’s permit on his providing a public viewing platform
on his upland property likely would meet the “essential nexus” test. 38 It
is unlikely that, if most homeowners were forced to choose, they would
prefer such a public platform on their upland property over the northsouth transit easement along the oceanfront that the state actually

36. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
37. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987).
38. Id. at 836 (“[S]o long as the Commission could have exercised its police power . . . to
forbid construction of the house altogether . . . [a] condition would be constitutional even if it
consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for
passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.”).
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proposed.39 Yet the holding in Koontz confirms that Nollan’s “nexus” test
prohibited California from bestowing a discretionary development
authorization in exchange for a non-“nexused” beach access way only
because the state failed to present an option that was far less desirable to
the applicant.
Whether on the Nollan facts a condition requiring a viewing platform
would have been considered “roughly proportional,” as Dolan came to
require seven years after Nollan, is not clear. However, it is conceivable
that some conditions that meet both Nollan and Dolan would be so
objectionable to developers that they are pressed to choose the alternative
conditions that do not technically comply with the “nexus” and
“proportionality” tests but the permitting authority reasonably believes
better serve the public interest.
c. Fashioning Restrictions As Use Limitations, Not Exactions
The state might follow the successful path charted by the City of San
Jose in a recent dispute by contending that the conditions at issue do not
constitute exactions at all but rather merely place limitations on the way
a landowner may use her property. In CBIA v. City of San Jose, the
California Supreme Court declared that an ordinance requiring
developers of twenty or more residential units to set aside at least fifteen
percent of those units for affordable housing amounted to an ordinary
regulatory restriction on the use of property, not an exaction, because the
state’s action did not technically require the payment of money or the
physical dedication of property to public use.40 The CBIA court even went
one step further to assert that Nollan and Dolan do not apply in situations
where the government action “makes clear that its purpose goes beyond
mitigating the impacts attributable to the proposed developments that are
subject to [it].”41

39. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on
the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (1991);
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 522 n.42 (2012).
40. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 988 (Cal. 2015) (“[T]here
can be no valid unconstitutional-conditions takings claim without a government exaction of
property, and the ordinance in the present case does not effect an exaction. Rather, the ordinance
is an example of a municipality’s permissible regulation of the use of land under its broad police
power.”); id. at 991 (“[L]ike many other land use regulations, this condition simply places a
restriction on the way the developer may use its property by limiting the price for which the
developer may offer some of its units for sale.”). The claimants have filed a petition for certiorari
with the U.S. Supreme Court.
41. Id. at 1000.
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d. Challenging the Premise that an Illegal Act Can Give Rise to
Takings Liability
The final two courses entail more broadly contesting Nollan and
Dolan’s foundations, and they could be adopted in conjunction with most
of those courses already presented. While challenging the very premise
of the Court’s now-entrenched exaction takings jurisprudence is a tall
task, a governmental entity making such a claim could look to the silver
lining of the otherwise confounding recent decision in Starr International
Company v. U.S.42 for support. In a complaint described by the news
editor of the National Review as “shameless,”43 AIG shareholders alleged
that the Federal Reserve Bank had imposed overly demanding conditions
on an $85 billion, taxpayer-funded bailout loan that allowed the company
to avoid bankruptcy.44 To many observers’ surprise, the federal district
court found the federal government liable for an “illegal exaction” on the
theory that the government had usurped its authority under the Federal
Reserve Act by taking an equity share in a rescued company. 45 Yet the
court simultaneously asserted that illegal exactions cannot give rise to
Fifth Amendment takings liability.46 By way of analogy, then, Starr
International leaves government entities in land use exaction cases with
the possible defense that conditions deemed illegal on the similar,
unconstitutional conditions logic of Koontz cannot give rise to takings
liability and its associated compensation remedy either.
Such an approach is far from a slam dunk; Koontz very well may be
interpreted to preclude this line of reasoning in the future. But at the
moment, given the vague and perplexing nature of the majority opinion
in Koontz,47 this position theoretically remains viable and, in the right
circumstances, could find sympathetic ears in some courts.
e. Renewing an Unqualified Challenge to Nollan and Dolan
Taking the prior approach one step further, government entities might
reinvigorate the long dormant and admittedly uphill battle to reverse
Nollan and Dolan in their entirety.48 Nollan and Dolan accept that the
42. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (2015).
43. Tim Cavanaugh, 5 Reasons the Gov’t Might Lose the AIG Lawsuit, NAT’L REV. (Oct.
10,
2014),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/389994/5-reasons-govt-might-lose-aiglawsuit-tim-cavanaugh?target=author&tid=1107329.
44. Starr Int’l Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 430–31.
45. Id. at 434.
46. Id. at 472.
47. On the confusing nature of Koontz, see, for example, Echeverria, supra note 19;
Echeverria, supra note 20; Fenster, supra note 20; Nolon, supra note 1.
48. Laura Underkuffler offered some compelling, wide-ranging remarks in this regard in
her keynote address at the Association for Law, Property and Society Annual Conference in May
of 2015. Laura Underkuffler, Keynote Address at the 2015 ALPS Conference at the University of
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government could deny the relevant permit application outright under the
current state of the law “unless the denial would interfere so drastically
with the [claimants’] use of their property”49 under the traditional
regulatory takings framework first discussed in Penn Central. Few, if
any, would suggest that denials of the permit applications on the Nollan
and Dolan facts would constitute such a drastic interference, for the
claimants in those cases already were putting their respective parcels to
significant use.50 One might question, then, why the Court found it
appropriate to apply heightened judicial scrutiny when reviewing (and to
afford the possibility of a compensatory remedy for) government
proposals that the applicant might prefer to the legal status quo.51
f. Summary
Each of the five additional approaches presented above surely comes
with considerable uncertainty for the state, and this essay does not
advocate for any of them on normative grounds. Rather, they are offered
here simply to demonstrate that, in the post-Koontz world in which
permitting entities must operate, the list of potential government moves
is even more expansive than Professor Nolon’s article stakes out. It may
be fodder for future empirical work to determine which of these
approaches—and the assuredly many other approaches that are not
discussed here—the myriad state and municipal entities adopt moving
forward.
CONCLUSION
Seizing on an opening created by the Supreme Court’s vague opinion
in Koontz, the recent state appellate decision on remand extends the
retroactive takings compensation principle of First English into the realm
of exactions. This decision serves to highlight the chilling effect
emanating from Koontz about which Professor Nolon is rightly
concerned. Professor Nolon explained how the list of potential
government responses in the confusing and chilling post-Koontz world is
extensive, and this essay adds even more possibilities. Unless and until
the Supreme Court conducts a pragmatic reevaluation of its exaction
Georgia: From Bailouts to Bogs—Shaking the Takings Money Tree (May 1, 2015) (written
remarks on file with author).
49. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). See also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994).
50. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS 198, 226
(2010) (explaining that a successful takings claim “depends on the court’s determination of the
whole unity of property at issue”).
51. See, e.g., Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 444 (2015) (“[T]he AIG
Board of Directors decided that accepting the loan was a better alternative than bankruptcy.”);
Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 334–35;
Underkuffler, supra note 48.
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takings jurisprudence,52 each potential response is in need of deep
analytical and empirical assessment. Professor Nolon’s article
thoughtfully starts us on this path.

52. The final chapter of the Koontz saga is yet to be written, as the state has filed a petition
for certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court seeking review of the decision on remand.

